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Abstract
This paper is a theoretical analysis of the cognitive free-fall meta-
phor, used within the cognitive view, as a model for explaining the 
communication process between a generator and a receiver of a 
message. Its aim is to demonstrate that the idea of a cognitive free 
fall taking place within this communication process leads to apparent 
theoretical paradoxes, partly fostered by unclear definitions of key 
information-science concepts—namely, tokens, signs, information, 
and knowledge and their interrelatedness—and a naïve theoretical 
framework. The paper promotes a semiotically inspired model of 
communication that demonstrates that what takes place in commu-
nication is not a cognitive free fall, but rather a fall from a pragmatic 
level of knowing or knowledge to a level of representation or infor-
mation. The paper further argues that the communication process 
more ideally can be expressed as a complex interrelation of emotion, 
information, and cognition. 
The essential office of the copula is to express a relation of a general 
term or terms to the universe. The universe must be well known and mu-
tually known to be known and agreed to exist, in some sense, between 
speaker and hearer, between the mind as appealing to its own further 
consideration and the mind as so appealed to, or there can be no com-
munication, or “common ground,” at all. The universe is, thus, not a 
mere concept, but is the most real of experiences. 
—Charles Sanders Peirce (1933, p. 396)
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Introduction
This is the third article in our series about the semiotic view in library and 
information science (LIS). The first, “Emotion, Information, and Cogni-
tion and Some Possible Consequences for Library and Information Sci-
ence” (Thellefsen, Thellefsen, & Sørensen, 2013), concerned two aspects: 
the meaning-creation process and the communication of meaning. We 
successively argued in favor of a semiotic-inspired information concept, 
that information always causes emotional effects, and that interpreted 
information is to be considered knowledge. Additionally, we developed 
our concept of information in relation to the information systems–ori-
ented, user-oriented, and community-oriented perspectives in LIS. In our 
second article, “The Information Concept of Nicholas Belkin Revisited: 
Some Semiotic Comments” (Thellefsen, Thellefsen, & Sørensen, 2014), 
we analyzed Belkin’s concept of information as it is expressed in his “In-
formation Concepts for Information Science” (1978). Based on Belkin’s 
eight requirements for an information concept, we deduced a model of 
communication, and compared this model with our semiotically inspired 
communication model, the Dynacom. Based on our analyses, we con-
cluded that Belkin’s model ignores both the effect caused by informa-
tion when perceived by an interpreter and the structural relation exist-
ing between information and knowledge. This third article is inspired by 
one of the key suppositions within the cognitive view: the mechanism of 
the “cognitive free fall” as suggested by Ingwersen and Järvelin (2005a, 
2005b). In their book The Turn, they argue that the cognitive free fall pre-
conditions communication and happens whenever a message is commu-
nicated between a sender and a receiver, regardless of whether the sender 
is a human being or machine. Consequently, the idea of a cognitive free 
fall seems to be important in the definition of communication within the 
theoretical confines of the cognitive turn. The cognitive free fall is a fac-
tor determining the circumstances and probability of successful commu-
nication; it is a critical factor in any information-seeking process. The aim 
of this article is to look into the theoretical assumptions of the cognitive 
free-fall metaphor. We will do this by determining the consequences lead-
ing from the conception of the cognitive free fall, and will analyze the 
conception in relation to our semiotically inspired model of communica-
tion, the Dynacom (Thellefsen, Sørensen, & Thellefsen, 2011), in order 
to demonstrate that communication is pragmatic by nature and that the 
idea of a cognitive free fall seems to be a dead end. Based in a pragmatic 
semiotic viewpoint, we argue that communication takes place within a 
universe of discourse and in relation to shared collateral experience be-
tween the utterer (sender) and the interpreter (receiver). Consequently, 
defending the idea of a cognitive free fall that conditions any communica-
tion process does not seem reasonable. 
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The Cognitive View and Why the Cognitive  
Free Fall Is an Important Concept
There is no doubt that the work of Ingwersen and Järvelin (2005a, 2005b) 
has had, and still has, a vast influence in determining the direction for 
research in LIS. According to Talja, Tuominen, and Savolainen (2005), 
the constructivist ideas of information science (IS) are commonly labeled 
under “the cognitive viewpoint.” The cognitive viewpoint, as initially for-
mulated by Belkin and colleagues (Belkin, 1984, 1990; Belkin, Oddy, & 
Brooks, 1982), Brookes (1980), and Ingwersen (1982, 1992) does not, 
however, represent cognitivism. Cognitivism is an approach that is signifi-
cantly related to artificial intelligence in drawing straightforward analo-
gies between human information processing and computing (Ingwersen, 
1992, pp. 19–25, 227). The cognitive viewpoint in IS differs from cognitiv-
ism by laying major emphasis on the way in which knowledge is actively 
built up by the cognizing subject—that is, by the individual mind—to 
serve the organization of internal and external reality. Consequently, the 
cognitive viewpoint emphasizes the concept of knowledge, and in partic-
ular an idea of knowledge that somehow is confined to the individual 
mind. Knowledge thus differs from external reality (considering that in-
formation retrieval [IR] regards relevance as a match between internal 
and external knowledge structures); in other words, the cognitive view-
point prioritizes individually constructed knowledge structures. The idea 
of the cognitive free fall plays an important role in describing this relation 
and has been formulated by Ingwersen and Järvelin (2005b), whom we 
quote at length:
The most important dimension of the cognitive view is that during any act 
of human or computerized communication the viewpoint regards all 
communicated messages as signs transferred at a linguistic surface level. The 
signs may be transformed into information at a cognitive level only via percep-
tion and interpretation by the individual recipient’s current cognitive state in 
context. The interpretation or association then transforms the cognitive 
state into a new state and the second condition is fulfilled. 
 Consequently, this view implies an immediate cognitive “free fall” of a message 
into the lowest levels of linguistic nature. The consequence is that any inten-
tionality, meaning, implicit context and potential informativeness underlying 
the generated and communicated message are immediately lost. They have to 
be rebuilt and recovered, i.e., interpreted and constructed, by the recipient by 
means of those presuppositions in context, which make him/it participate in 
the communication act. . . . If a recipient cannot perceive the message, 
although he wishes to do so, information transfer does not take place. 
The message prevails at sign level containing all its potentials of mean-
ing, information and cognition hidden from that recipient. If perceived, 
the signs may develop through some or all of the processing levels from morpho-
lexical to pragmatics, as guided by the recipient’s world model in context. The 
meaning of a message may hence be disambiguated at a semantic level 
into a common semantic value and sense, either because the message 
itself supplies adequate and understandable context, and/or the recipi-
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ent adds his own context, probably but not necessarily also shared by 
other actors. (pp. 36–37; emphasis added) 
According to Belkin (1978) and Ingwersen and Järvelin (2005a, 
2005b), any act of communication involves a generator (or sender), a 
message, and a recipient. Therefore, according to Ingwersen and Järvelin, 
when the generator communicates something to a recipient, the message 
becomes stripped from intentionality, meaning, implicit context, and po-
tential informativeness of the generator and falls on to a linguistic surface 
level. This is shown in figure 1.
In their article “The Sense of Information: Understanding the Cogni-
tive Conditional Information Concept in Relation to Information Acqui-
sition” (2005a), Ingwersen and Järvelin write that “the signs in the mes-
sage fall back to a morpho-lexical state. They become data. The original 
(linguistic) conventions binding them together like grammar, cases and 
meaning (sense) are also present as signs themselves or have disappeared 
completely. A text or oral message simply becomes a string of signs, which 
have to be decoded by means of interpretation of a recipient, e.g., a read-
er” (p. 10). Success in communication depends on whether or not the 
recipient is capable of reconstructing the intentionality of the genera-
tor, the meaning of what is communicated, its context, and its potential 
informativeness. However, in order for the recipient to reconstruct the 
communicated, he, according to Belkin (1978), also needs to request or 
desire what is communicated. This line of reasoning we can illustrate with 
the communication model based on Belkin’s eight requirements for com-
munication detailed in his classic article “Information Concepts for Infor-
mation Science” (1978) (fig. 2). 
In Ingwersen and Järvelin (2005a), the information concept is devel-
oped further: “On the one hand, information being something which is 
the result of a transformation of a generator’s knowledge structures (by 
intentionality, model of the recipients’ states of knowledge, and in the 
form of signs), and on the other hand something which, when perceived, 
affects and transforms the recipient’s state of knowledge” (p. 10). And 
they add four situations in which man/machine relations occur, and con-
clude that it is only when the receiver is a human actor that communica-
tion of information may take place. The four situations are the following:
1. Human actor/machine communication: the conveyed data (message or po-
tential information) remain signs at a linguistic surface level.
2. Human actor/human actor communication: the data (message or potential 
information) may turn into information in a cognitive sense, depending 
on the state of knowledge of the recipient actor.
3. Machine/human actor communication: the conveyed data (message or po-
tential information) may turn into information in a cognitive sense, 
depending on the state of knowledge of the recipient actor.
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4. Machine/machine communication: the conveyed data (message or potential 
information) remain signs at a linguistic surface level (pp. 10–11).
We agree with the fact that communication involves an active interpreter. 
However, we are amazed that there are no sufficient definitions of data, 
potential information, and information and its inherent relations. 
The conception of the cognitive free fall suggests that the fall comes to 
a stop at a linguistic surface level, which must be identical to the morpho-
lexical level mentioned by Ingwersen and Järvelin in the above quotation. 
From a linguistic perspective, they must assume that the cognitive fall takes 
place on a pragmatic level (language use) through a semantic landing 
on a linguistic surface level (in principle, the level of formal semantics). 
They must also assume that language is a unified code that structurally 
attaches to cognitive or mental knowledge structures, and that the mental 
activity of human beings follows that very same structure. Our question 
is: Why should the cognitive free fall occur, if such a fall exists at all? Is 
it possible to imagine language or even words without purpose or mean-
ing? Language may be reduced to tokens (the linguistic surface level), but 
this would only be the case between artificial quasi-minds—for example, 
computers. Human agents always approach language from a pragmatic 
level, using it to communicate meanings, also in written form. Texts are 
Figure 1. The cognitive free-fall metaphor illustrated. According to Ingwersen and 
Järvelin (2005b), the only way the recipient can pick up the message from the cogni-
tive free fall is by reconstructing the message based on his own cognitive abilities. 
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thus intentionally formulated. Stripping texts from their intentionality is 
possible by means of tokens or lemmas that, in principle, render texts 
meaningless. Here, statistical methods can be used in order to express 
semantic frequency and relations among semantic units—as, for example, 
in automatic indexing. Thus, from this viewpoint, human agents must as-
cribe meanings and interpret the tokens in order to reconstruct what is 
communicated. This view is strong because it renders texts objective at 
the surface level and is controllable. 
According to the four situations mentioned above, we agree that ma-
chines do not possess cognitive ability; therefore, the human agent as 
receiver is mandatory for communication to take place. Success in com-
munication depends on whether or not the recipient is capable of recon-
structing the intentionality of the generator. In our view, human agents 
are, in contrast to computers, language users, and the purpose of lan-
guage is to communicate meaning; therefore, the use of language, and 
understanding the meaning of language communicated among human 
agents, takes place on a pragmatic level of linguistics. As human agents, 
we learn, understand, and use language before we even consider gram-
mar, sentences, and semantic units. Actually, human agents may commu-
nicate perfectly without even knowing semantic structures and grammar. 
Consequently, because human agents are pragmatic language users, the 
idea of a cognitive free fall among human agents is unlikely. 
A cognitive free fall can only take place if the text is stripped from in-
tentionality and possible meanings, which is the case with statistical meth-
ods. If texts are reduced to groups of words, they no longer express the 
intentionality of the generator (author); in principle, the text parser has 
become a new generator. However, even groups of words, stripped from 
their original intentionality, are meaningful to human agents because 
they now possess new intentionalities; namely, the purpose of being data 
sets. Consequently, for human agents at the receiving end, a cognitive free 
fall seems implausible. A cognitive free fall between computers also seems 
implausible, simply because computers do not possess cognitive ability. 
Figure 2. Belkin’s communication model based on his article “Information Concepts 
for Information Science” (1978).
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In our view, we would say that a fall in cognition takes place from a 
knowledge level to an informational level. Ingwersen and Järvelin (2005a, 
2005b) seem to imply that cognition only takes place via natural language. 
However, in our semiotic view, cognition can be prior to language and 
involve sign systems other than language alone. Several studies suggest 
that that these sign systems (for example, nonverbal language) are much 
more universal and fundamental than our verbal and written languages, 
as Zaltman and Coulter (1995) write in their article “Seeing the voice of 
the Customer: Metaphor-based Advertising Research,” referring to stud-
ies within linguistics, anthropology, neurolinguistics, and so on:
The growing understanding of the role of all basic senses in learning 
and communication processes reinforces the assumption that nonver-
bal communication is dominant. . . . An important part of this under-
standing is the growing knowledge of the role of interactions (called 
synesthesia) among sensory modalities in our “making sense” of our 
world. . . . It is also of significance that verbal language developed only 
recently in the context of human evolution and written language de-
veloped even more recently. Thus, the human brain did not evolve to 
favor verbal functions, especially not written communication functions. 
Rather, emphasis was placed on the elaborate production of nonverbal 
channels of communication. (p. 37)
As previously mentioned, we find it problematic that Ingwersen and 
Järvelin do not provide or refer to a theoretical framework, nor do they 
offer a thorough analysis of the interrelation and differences among data, 
potential information, information, and knowledge. Furthermore, it is un-
clear what they mean by the concepts of signs and tokens. These concepts 
are not defined or justified by references, and, additionally, when the au-
thors argue in favor of a cognitive theoretical approach—or to be precise, 
a cognitive view—there is a surprising lack of references. Cognition and 
language, and the relations between these two important concepts, have 
occupied human beings for millennia, and semiotics is a broad and het-
erogeneous field in which numerous definitions of sign can be found, but 
it is unclear how Ingwersen and Järvelin define it.
In our view, it is pointless to operate with the cognitive free fall as the 
fundamental premise for communication. In his 1868 article “Some Con-
sequences of Four Incapacities,” Charles Sanders Peirce provides us with 
the following definition of the sign: “No present actual thought (which is 
a mere feeling) has any meaning, any intellectual value; for this lies not 
in what is actually thought, but in what this thought may be connected 
with in representation by subsequent thoughts; so that the meaning of a 
thought is altogether something virtual” (p. 289). We will return to this 
definition when we discuss an example of a library user searching “belkin, 
nicholas” when making a query. In the next section, we will demonstrate 
how the cognitive process in communication is more appropriately un-
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derstood from a semiotic perspective, which involves emotion, informa-
tion, and cognition. 
Cognition in a Pheno-Semiotical Perspective
According to our semiotic view, cognition involves two other elements: 
emotion and information. In order to understand the nature of these 
concepts in relation to our analysis of the conception of the cognitive free 
fall, we will define emotion, information, and knowledge and show how 
they are related and what role they play in the meaning-creation process 
and hence in communication. We will argue that the cognitive free-fall 
metaphor should be understood in relation to information rather than 
cognition. Ingwersen and Järvelin use the division of syntax, semantics, 
and pragmatics; this division was originally made by the American philos-
opher and semiotician Charles Morris, who was inspired by the medieval 
concept of the trivium and by his fellow American philosopher Peirce. 
However, the division made by Morris is not exclusively related to language 
but developed within a general semiotic framework. However, we have a 
suspicion that the cognitive free-fall metaphor in Ingwersen and Järvelin’s 
The Turn (2005b) is understood primarily within language, since the au-
thors argue that it is an important element in communication, and all 
examples used in The Turn regarding communication is based on spoken 
and written language. However, as noted above, language is not the only 
sign system used in cognition; rather, we believe that the division consist-
ing of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics can be seen as an elaboration 
of verbal-language information; furthermore, we believe that the division 
can be understood in relation to a trichotomy of emotion, information, 
and cognition. Therefore, the cognitive free-fall metaphor is not a fall in 
cognition but a fall from a pragmatic level to a morpho-lexical level within 
information. Let us take a closer look at this trichotomy and place the 
division of syntax (we use syntax here synonymously with morpho-lexical), 
semantics, and pragmatics in relation to the concept of information. 
Emotion, Information, and Cognition
The trichotomy of emotion, information, and cognition follows the 
logic of Peirce’s phenomenological classes: firstness, secondness, and 
thirdness—emotion being firstness (potentiality); information, second-
ness (actuality); and cognition, thirdness (mediation). (See Thellefsen, 
Thellefsen, and Sørensen [2013] and Sørensen, Thellefsen, and Thellef-
sen [2014] for further elaboration on these concepts.) Understanding 
emotion as firstness entails that “an emotion of the mind is real, in the 
sense that it exists in the mind whether we are distinctly conscious of it or 
not. But it is not external because although it does not depend upon what 
we think about it, it does depend upon our state of our thoughts about 
something” (Peirce, 1958a, p. 209). Consequently, emotion is real though 
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internal, what Peirce also calls ego. Likewise, information has a real being 
and place in secondness; information is facts. Consequently, information 
is both real and external—that is, it is non-ego. Being non-ego, informa-
tion is the only thing that can create emotional effects. As Peirce states, 
“Every stimulus to action is derived from perception” (1986, p. 265). 
(This is accentuated by Smyth [1977]: “Every idea that can end as a clear 
idea must begin as an idea that is made in us by the things that force them-
selves to our attention and stimulate inquiry” [p. 101].) Furthermore, ac-
cording to Peirce, “Everything in which we take the least interest creates 
in us its own particular emotion, however slight this may be. The emotion 
is a sign and a predicate of a thing” (1934, p. 184). We may conclude that 
any stimulus is caused by information.
Therefore, we have emotion as the internal and information as the ex-
ternal. Let us present some examples: A given book is full of information 
independent of what you may feel or think about it; it may just sit there on 
the bookshelf unread. Still, it is full of information. Imagine a twig broken 
in two by the wind; even though no one hears the sound, the sound is still 
information. A deer running across a plain is information, even if no one 
sees it. 
Information at this level of cognition does not entail interpretation. 
The information in a given database is there, independent of what you 
may think or feel about it. However, if someone reads the book, hears the 
twig break, sees and hears the deer run, or searches a database, the infor-
mation will cause emotional effects in the interpreter. However, there is 
only one element that can bridge the gap between the internal and exter-
nal worlds—the third element, cognition. We believe this is what Peirce 
says in the following: “The past is the inner world, the present the outer 
world. Now, this joined with feeling (which it involves or requires) might 
be called consciousness and would be the world, were it not for the phe-
nomena of error and ignorance, which forces us to reflect that there were 
two worlds in that two-sided consciousness” (1958b, p. 199). It is cognition 
that creates the relation between some given information and the emotions 
it causes intelligible. This is shown in figure 3. Returning to the cogni-
tive free-fall metaphor, Ingwersen and Järvelin (2005a, 2005b) state that it 
falls from a pragmatic level, through a semantic level, and ends on a syn-
tactic level. However, we think that by applying these concepts, they have 
outlined a perspective of information caused by language alone (fig. 4). 
Information as verbal language has a morpho-lexical level: grammati-
cal rules; it has a semantic level: the meaning of the word; and it has a 
pragmatic level: the use of the word. These all refer to information. If 
someone says to you in Danish, Se, en hund! (Look, a dog!), while vigor-
ously pointing in the direction of the dog and you do not understand 
Danish, this information may be useless to you; however, it is still infor-
mation (compare the above examples of the book on the bookshelf, the 
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twig, and the deer). If you do not know what the information informs 
you about and you are unsure of the contextual settings surrounding the 
information, you should experience, according to the cognitive free-fall 
metaphor, a cognitive free fall. The information should fall from a prag-
matic level, through a semantic level, and to the linguistic level, where 
the interpreter should start picking up the language by piecing the letters 
together. Is this really the case? Does “Look, a dog!” fall from a pragmatic 
level to a linguistic surface level when it leaves the speaker’s mouth and 
strikes the hearer’s perceptive apparatus? We think the answer is no; in-
stead, we think the phrase “Look, a dog!” is knowledge within the head of 
the speaker laden with intentionality, informativeness, and so on. When 
the words leave the mouth of the speaker, they become meaningful infor-
mation, and because the interpreter does not possess collateral knowledge 
(background knowledge) and hence cannot create the right universe of 
discourse (the contextual setting), the words remain information, but 
they become stripped from meaning (from the interpreter’s perspective). 
However, since language is not the only sign system used in cognition, 
the speaker may use different kinds of nonverbalized communication in 
order to make the interpreter understand the message. Since nonver-
balized communication, in many cases, transcends cultures, the speaker 
can make the interpreter understand the message even if he does not 
understand the spoken language. This is exactly the case here. The pitch 
Figure 3. It is cognition that bridges the gap between the internal world (emotion) 
and the external world (information) and makes the relation general, stable, and, 
thereby, intelligible. Consequently, the model depicted is cognition par excellence. 
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of voice carries information, as does the tone of voice. These qualities of 
the voice suggest something more than the mere syntactic and semantic 
content of the phrase “Look, a dog!” The speaker points vigorously at the 
dog; the pointing finger is a universal indexical and pragmatic use of sign 
language that points something out in time and place (deixis). The finger 
points to some semantic level of the language—namely, the presence of a 
dog. In this example of communication, no explicit morpho-lexical level 
is necessary in order for the interpreter to interpret and understand the 
communication. 
Let us use another example clarifying that there is something prag-
matic present in communication that is not tied to a morpho-lexical level. 
Say, a person needs a book about IS and knows that Belkin is a key figure 
in the field. Consequently, he searches the Web of Science database for 
references and documents by Belkin using the words “belkin, nicholas.” 
According to the cognitive free-fall metaphor, when the user plugs in “bel-
kin, nicholas,” the name takes a cognitive fall down onto a linguistic sur-
face level because now it is just letters at a computer screen organized in 
accordance to some given morpho-lexical rules. This is the first step in the 
communication process between the library user and the search engine 
(fig. 5). 
Figure 4. In our semiotic view, the trichotomy of syntactics, semantics, and prag-
matics is related to language and thus information. We believe that all language is 
information, but that not all information is language. Information is signs of the 
type: icon, index, symbol. It is information that causes emotions to occur, and, when 
cognized, may cause knowledge to occur. 
Cognition
Emotion 
(internal)
Information  
(external)
Morpho-Lexical 
Level Semantics 
Pragmatics
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The user (generator) communicates a message “belkin, nicholas” to 
the information system; now it is the computer’s task (the recipient) to 
reconstruct the intentionality of the generator, the meaning of what has 
been communicated, its context, and its potential informativeness. This 
is, of course, a task the computer cannot perform; cognition presup- 
poses consciousness, but the computer lacks consciousness and hence 
cannot perform a cognitive reconstruction. We believe that Ingwersen 
and Järvelin (2005a) will agree, since they write that in relation to hu-
man/computer communication, the conveyed data remain signs at a lin-
guistic surface level inside the computer (pp. 10–11).
However, the computer can match the query with documents con-
taining the author “belkin, nicholas,” and this matching takes place on a 
morpho-lexical level. Consequently, it is the user who has to make the 
cognitive reconstruction of his query by analyzing the findings of the 
computer. This does not imply a cognitive free fall; instead, the query 
(that is, the message in the communication model) “belkin, nicholas” is 
a sign that represents the works of Belkin that is at least based on the 
user’s knowledge about Belkin and confers Peirce’s definition of the sign 
cited above. However, whether or not the words “belkin, nicholas” are in 
Figure 5. This figure shows the idea of the cognitive free fall in communication: the 
generator sends a message; the content of the message takes a cognitive free fall; 
and the recipient must make a cognitive reconstruction of the message in order to 
understand the communication of the generator. 
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the mind of the user or are written in the search formula, it is still a sign 
and represents aspects of Belkin. In the head of the user, it is knowledge; 
in the search formula, it is information representing the knowledge and 
intentions of the user. When it returns to the user, the user uses his knowl-
edge about Belkin to evaluate the relevance of the documents found in 
the database. 
Nowhere in this description has a cognitive free fall been taking place. 
Instead of such a free fall, there is a change in cognition happening when 
the speaker communicates a sign, which in some way creates an effect in 
the interpreter. The sign is knowledge when it is in the head of the speak-
er; the sign becomes information when it leaves the head of the speaker; 
and it becomes knowledge again when it is interpreted by the hearer. 
However, it is important to add that it will not be the same knowledge as 
was in the head of the speaker. Based on the collateral experience of the 
interpreter, he will interpret aspects of the sign communicated, and it is 
these aspects that he, through cognition, transforms to knowledge. 
With respect to our example of the library user and his communicat-
ing the sign “belkin, nicholas” to the library database, when it leaves the 
user’s mind it becomes information. It is true, as Ingwersen and Järvelin 
(2005a) write, that the sign will remain at a morpho-lexical level in rela-
tion to the computer, but this is not the interesting part here. The sign 
“belkin, nicholas” will remain a sign representing aspects of Nicholas Bel-
kin in relation to the collateral experience of the library user; and it is the 
collateral experience he uses when he evaluates the result of the search. 
The user is in some way having a dialogue with himself that is mediated by 
the computer. Also, it is only the library user that can evaluate the results 
of the search. In this sense, the library database becomes a kind of quasi-
interpreter, and the search process is a kind of quasi-dialog between the li-
brary user and his future critical self. In figure 6, we present our semiotic-
inspired communication model. (We will not go into detail about it here; 
see instead Thellefsen, Sørensen, and Thellefsen [2011] and Thellefsen, 
Thellefsen, and Sørensen [2013, 2014] for further information.)
The presence of collateral experience, held by the speaker and the in-
terpreter, prevents a cognitive free fall. Humans always share some collat-
eral experiences (for example, universal sign gestures). Humans have an 
inherent tendency to make representations, and this potential is unique 
and great. Hence, they can develop and discover representations of their 
inner worlds, social worlds, and outer worlds, and the continuous and 
complex contacts among these, in an infinite number of ways. 
Conclusion
According to Ingwersen and Järvelin (2005a, 2005b), the cognitive free 
fall is a central element in communication. The cognitive free fall takes 
place from a pragmatic level, through a semantic level, and lands on a 
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syntactic surface level, which is identical to a morpho-lexical level, when-
ever a speaker or generator communicates a message. When an interpret-
er or recipient receives a message, he must reconstruct it from a morpho-
lexical level into a pragmatic level, where he may be able to understand 
what was communicated. We have argued that this is not the case; that 
instead, cognition is not exclusively tied to a verbal language but is of-
ten prior to language, and cognition involves many more aspects than 
what can be identified in a verbal and written language. By applying our 
semiotic-inspired communication model, the Dynacom, we have argued 
that there is a change in signs from a knowledge/cognitive level to an 
information level. In our view, information is secondness, non-ego, and of 
the nature of icons, indices, and symbols, whereas knowledge is the result 
of interpretation involving signs of thirdness: rhema, dicisigns, and argu-
ments. Whenever a sign is communicated and leaves the originator, it falls 
from a knowledge level to a level of information. And, when interpreted 
by the interpreter, it becomes knowledge again. This is a continuous semi-
otic process of externalization and internalization that presupposes that 
the interpreter possesses collateral experience regarding the sign, where 
Figure 6. The Dynacom in action.
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collateral experience frames the contextual conditions, such as accepted 
theories, axioms, discussions with colleagues, or networks of thoughts 
(Hausmann, 2012a, 2012b). Based on our analyses, we conclude that the 
conception of a cognitive free fall taking place in communication is a fal-
lacy. 
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